. Wittgenstein pointed to the epistemological significance of puzzle pictures, such as the ambiguous “duck-rabbit” that can be seen either as a duck’s head facing one way or a rabbit’s head facing another way. Rescuing Wollheim's account without the support of Wittgenstein --pt. is connected with 'I'm trying to see it as . Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects 3 another, in the sense which Richard Wollheim has given to his notion,4 the change involves moving from seeing one thing in the figure to seeing a different, and incompatible, thing in it-from seeing a duck in the figure to seeing a rabbit in it. Our eyes do not 'see', we do. For now, however, we are concerned with one simple question. And so on. My doubt, in particular, is that Russell would actually mean such silliness by his use of the word "habit." To interpret it as a wire frame, we imagine that the sides of the figure are not solid, and that the lines are made out of thin metal wire. He continues in this manner by asking whether we are actually seeing something different in each instance or whether we are seeing the same thing and merely interpreting it one way or the other. Ideas such as these can properly be called interpretations. ). As Wittgenstein writes in the above sections, he takes 'interpretation' to be an action in which we make a conjecture or an inference, which may end up being false. What science has discovered about the human body has led traditional philosophy, in its attempt to conform to the findings of science, to accept a number of presuppositions. We speak this way normally because no alternatives are relevant in such a case, since to our knowledge there are no alternative aspects to the object in question. This is the introduction to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, eds. ): (1) a bundle of specific light frequencies is entering my eyes and is being refracted through the lenses, registering on my rods and cones; (2) the eyes are now sending this data by electrochemical signals along the optic nerve to my brain; (3) such data is now spontaneously interpreted, based upon inductive familiarity with similar bundles of data in the past, and determined to indicate the presence of a cat. .' These are the simple brute facts of our existence. If, by the word "habit," Russell means that we have come to make these inferences so often and so routinely that such a practice has now become seemingly automatic to us, would he not be implying that at one time in our lives, before we developed such habits, our perceptions actually did not occur to us spontaneously as they do now? When we look at the duck-rabbit, without any awareness that it can be seen two different ways, we only see either a duck or a rabbit. Or to speak more exactly, there is no evidence that there are illusions of the senses. It is not tenable to use the concept to denote unconscious, mechanistic processes in the brain. See §94 and §184, for example, in Ibid. This type of analysis is infused in Bertrand Russell's treatment of what we can be said to be doing when we 'see': In our environment it frequently happens that events occur together in bundles--such bundles as distinguish a cat from another kind of object. Wittgenstein’s concept of seeing-as (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). By“very big”, I believe he means both that the aestheticdimension weaves itself through all of philosophy in the mannersuggested above, and that the reach of the aesthetic in humanaffairs is very much greater than the far more restricted reach of theartistic; the world is densely packed with manifestations ofthe aesthetic sense or aesthetic interest, while the number of works ofart i… Most of these are not used to represent anything. Wittgenstein's influential discussion of "seeing as." Denonn, Lester E. Ed. So if a verificationist cannot provide an account of 'seeing', what can he give an account of? New York. Click here to navigate to respective pages. Wittgenstein is particularly troubled by this sort of theoretical reduction of what we can be said to be doing when we say we see something. A scientistic viewpoint ignores this need for clarification. Wittgenstein's claims, it should be noted, have the same implications for our other senses as well. Such illusions, through their ambiguity, show that there are in fact cases where we cansee as without need for interpretation, and thus 'seeing' is an experience which seems to come as a brute fact, neither having nor requiring verification in the form of a physicalistic account. Every sensation which is of a familiar kind brings with it various associated beliefs and expectations. (Aspects A.) Broadly speaking, a perceptive experience is a dogmatic belief in what physics and induction show to be probable; it is wrong in its dogmatism, but usually right in its content. Therefore, 'seeing', or 'seeing as' is simply an experience which neither has nor needs any kind of theoretical verification. In more specific terms, we become passive observers to the different aspects that the object seems to take on as we view it. In my opinion, it is not very fair nor does it demonstrate a grasp of the sheer complexity of Wittgenstein's thought to label him as a proponent of any of the above intellectual camps. If there is, can its ultimate reality be known if all that we have to rely on is our perceptions of it derived from our senses? There does not seem to be, however, anything that we can point to in this regard. We could say, as I understand Russell in his account of 'seeing' a cat, that these inferences are made out of habit, and therefore occur undetected by conscious thought. With Karl Johnson, Michael Gough, Tilda Swinton, John Quentin. R. Tilghman of affairs whereby they are able to express a sense and represent the world. This is the kind of similarity that we must look for, in order to justify the use of the word 'see' in that context. The Bertrand Russell Dictionary of Mind, Matter, and Morals. But in doing so he has to recognize that he is now utilizing two different meanings or uses for the word 'interpretation': (1) the unconscious processing and organizing of sensory data by the brain; and (2) the conscious and deliberate act of conjecturing or expressing a hypothesis. New Jersey. In this case, it involves observing the physical structure and mechanics of the eyes, optic nerves, and the region of the brain to which they attach, as well as the physical laws regarding the behavior of light. Philosophers have always wrestled with the problems of sense and perception. What this person spontaneously 'sees' is a bright light in the sky, and then consciously interprets it to be a UFO. etc., then put coins down on the counter, etc. A survey of various contexts. The problem, of course, lies in using the word 'interpretation' to denote the unconscious processing of sensory data in the brain. I want to revisit the topic in the hope of gaining some clarity on the matter. Volume I. In Russell's defense, we could say that it is a drawing of the same shape, a specific conglomeration of lines and curves, or something to that effect, but this seems trivial and unsatisfying to us--almost as if we were to say that the proper object of sense in this case is a "thing". In other words, if a verificationist cannot provide an empirically verifiable, theoretical account of what it is to 'see', then the entire verificationist project is dead because the means of verification itself will be rendered unverifiable. In this case, it is also safe to say that a hypothesis is consciously made which subsequently turns out to be false. In the case of 'seeing', therefore, Wittgenstein is trying to clarify the concept so as to show where scientific examination would and would not be applicable. We see it as two entirely different, alternating images, despite the fact that the drawing itself does not at all change. Induction allows us to infer that this pattern of light, which, we will suppose, looks like a cat, probably proceeds from a region in which the other properties of cats are also present. An examination of the way in which we conceptualize 'interpretation' will do much to shed light on the way in which we conceptualize 'seeing'. But to be able to give an account of what it is to 'believe', 'desire', 'understand', or 'see' (in the sense it has been discussed in this essay) is an entirely different matter. When we say that we see something, we are expressing a belief that a specific perception is apparent to us, wherein no alternative perceptions are relevant. pt. Wittgenstein’s seeing as . Wittgenstein does not have any quarrels with legitimate scientific inquiry or its findings. The reasoning behind such an opinion is that Wittgenstein does not subscribe to or advance any form of positive philosophical theory per se, for he does not believe that it is the purpose of philosophy to do so.Instead, Wittgenstein's "method", if we want to call it that, tends to be characterized by examining the various philosophical issues of his day in ways that no one before has. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. In the following sections we will examine where Wittgenstein seems to believe that the philosophy of psychology, in regard to the senses, has gone astray. --I couldn't answer: 'I take that to be a . Wittgenstein puts it this way: 75. Breadcrumbs Section. "Wittgenstein on Understanding". 1948. pp. He seems to be showing us, contrary to those who mistakenly take him to be a behaviorist, that there are internal, inexplicable things going on within us, that the things we do and experience cannot all be explained or accounted for by pointing to some physical origin or process. Let us put it another way. I t was Ludwig Wittgenstein who sparked philosophical interest in what psychologists call ambiguous figures. The basic evil of Russell's logic, as also of mine in the Tractatus, is that what a proposition is is illustrated by a few commonplace examples, and then pre-supposed as understood in full generality. Therefore, when modern psychology or neuroscience provides us with an empirical account of 'seeing', and tells us that the brain somehow 'organizes' visual data into recognizable perceptions, we tend to associate 'organizing' with 'interpreting', and say that it simply happens spontaneously and without conscious thought. Philosophers of psychology, in their efforts to determine theoretically what it is to 'see', or to provide a theoretical account of what it means to speak of 'seeing' something, have become tied up in this empirical, scientific picture. The various contexts and examples Wittgenstein introduces, it also becomes obvious that the seeing experience depends upon both the perceiving subject and the object perceived. 1980. pp. In Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein elaborates: Imagine a physiological explanation of the experience. In ordinary everyday life, however, there are many things for which only one interpretation is correct or the most plausible, such as when a person infers that there is a UFO hovering in the night sky and it turns out that it is only the planet Venus. The concepts themselves are entirely alien to each other. The meaning of the word is stretched so far as to include that which it seems to contradict. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Click here to navigate to parent product. Sharing the same physical location in space does not make it so that the word to denote the objects can be used to mean both concepts at once. One of the most interesting of Wittgenstein's challenges can be gleaned from the large number of passages devoted to the discussion of what he believes are the differences between 'seeing' and 'interpreting' that which one sees. If Russell means this by "habit," he is then treating 'seeing' as if it were a conscious process which we have developed to the point of needing to think little or nothing of while doing and have come to take for granted, like walking, riding a bicycle, or driving a five-speed clutch. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVII. Before you dismiss, please consider making a donation. .' You explain one mystery to me by another.' ', I could answer him only that way. 8. Either way we wish to look at it, a verificationist is forced to give some kind of theoretical account like the one above, or else abandon his program altogether. In order to help make sense of Wittgenstein's remarks, it becomes imperative to further and more thoroughly explicate the traditional philosophical views to which he seems to be objecting. University of Chicago Press. But if I now wanted to offer reasons against this way of putting things--what would I have to say? IV. Wittgenstein's opening remark is double-barreled: he states thatthe field of aesthetics is both very big and entirely misunderstood. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a stimulating presentation of a wide-ranging and sophisticated perspective, rigorous and yet generous with argumentative opponents, and making a significant contribution to the literature on the Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole. Wittgenstein then goes on to ask: "what does seeing the figure now this way and now that consist in?" His aim is to prevent us from adopting a 'scientistic' view of things, a view that every linguistic concept we use to describe what we do, such as 'seeing', 'believing', and 'understanding', point to factual, physical things in the world or in ourselves, and can thus be scientifically investigated and expounded. The brain is merely another organ in the body, the purpose of which is to facilitate the various things that human bodies do, such as thinking, walking, seeing, desiring, and interpreting. Upon a careful and painstaking reading of the rather cryptic and difficult passages within Ludwig Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, any reasonably intelligent person might still be left wondering what this obscure Austrian thinker might possibly be attempting to convey. For such theoretical reductions regarding psychological concepts, traditional philosophy is indebted at least in part to the influence of the verificationist movement in the early twentieth century, out of which came programs such as logical positivism (or logical empiricism) and Russell's logical atomism. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. Prentice Hall. .' Vol. In §515-517 of Volume II of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein puts it this way: 515. It points at the role of the perceiving subject, and at the perceived object. I find it to be much more plausible that by the word "habit," Russell is referring to a natural disposition or inclination of the human brain which works at the unconscious level. --not: "Put your left foot in front of your right foot etc. So, one might now ask, what exactly is 'Wittgensteinian' thought? He wants to show us that some concepts are in need of clarification before they can be properly examined or determined to be worth examining at all: For Wittgenstein, it is characteristic of the notions that figure in philosophical problems--prominently, mental concepts and linguistic concepts like meaning--that a structure is imposed on them, without grounding in the ordinary use of these notions and without being noticed, when they are taken to be amenable to certain explanatory projects. We mentally embellish the object in a way which conforms to what we believe the object is or may be meant to represent. At the same time, and as McGinn herself has insisted in previous work (1997), the Wittgensteinian aspect is not 'inner' or metaphysically 'private'. The data that the senses acquire and deliver to the brain via electrical impulses along the body's nervous system, as current psychological theories dictate, is manifested in the brain in the form of unorganized percepts (which can be considered another form of data). To this regard it is an action that is at least to some degree performed consciously and deliberately. 2. Simon & Schuster. The traditional stance on this issue would, of course, be of the former persuasion. That one sees the picture differently each time, if it is now a duck and now a rabbit--or, that what is the beak in the duck is the ears in the rabbit, etc.? In the Remarks on thePhilosophy of Psychology, Volumes I & II, Wittgenstein provides his readers with a wealth of counterexamples to our traditional philosophical accounts of various psychological phenomenon, all of which are designed to help demonstrate how such accounts seem to be misguided and mired in confusion. How can a brain by itself exhibit consciousness? We simply alternate between passively seeing the ambiguous picture as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit. (3). There is no verification for 'hearing' in this case, and there are no interpretations being made. 110. And if they were to be deemed meaningless, then how could any form of empirical verification be meaningful when empirical verification in itself is in fact wholly dependent upon statements which declare sensory observations (i.e., "I see where the optic nerve attaches to the brain")? University of Chicago Press. Directed by Derek Jarman. It might also be apt of us to say in this case, depending on the level of our skeptical sensibilities, that such a person's imagination has run wild, so to speak. Seeing through images does not mean that images are transparent windows onto reality: as Wittgenstein says in another context, one thinks “that one is retracing nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the form through which we see it“ (Wittgenstein 1993, §114, modified trans. An interpretation, as we have already established, is a conscious, deliberate act. He tries to actually look at how things are, rather than think about how things must be according to various a priori philosophical principles. . The meaning of the concept lies in this experience. Copyright © 1995-2021 Internet Infidels®. 517. Our eyes are not simply tools used by the brain which do the 'seeing' for it. Difficulties with Wollheim's borrowing from Wittgenstein --pt. We thus end up with an application of the word 'interpretation' which seems to go against its customary usage, namely that we take a word which is used to denote a conscious activity and use it to denote an unconscious one. Something militates against that--But can't I say: they look just the same, namely like this--and now I produce the ambiguous drawing. However the brain may organize and process information (even the terms 'process' or 'organize' may not be fitting, for we know relatively very little about how the brain functions in this regard) from the sensory apparati, it is not a case of 'interpretation' as the term is customarily used. The above figure is meant to show, as are the ones soon to be discussed, that there are in fact illusions of the senses and thus to conceptualize seeing (as well as any other sensory experience) simply as a process of absorbing and interpreting 'data' is to terribly confuse the idea of what it actually means to 'see'. His life seems to have been dominated by an obsession with moral and philosophical perfe… And since the meaning of this statement, according to proponents of this movement in philosophy, is the mode of empirically verifying its truth or falsity, such meaning must be put in terms of the method in which statement's truth or falsity is determined. We do not each exist as a brain in a vat. (In the same way we tell someone: "Go into the shop and buy . Again, to 'interpret' is to perform the act of making a conjecture, or to express a hypothesis, which may or may not turn out to be correct. It might seem logical or common-sensical to someone like Russell that the duck-rabbit figure is one and the same picture, and that we simply interpret it differently, but as it appears, we simply cannot escape the experience of seeing two entirely unique pictures. (9). However, there is something about the nature of this picture which tells against the traditional, theoretical account of what it is to 'see', namely that it appears to have the effect of an illusion. Upon Frege’sadvice, in 1911 he went to Cambridge to study with BertrandRussell. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, the way that we actually see the image changes in this particular instance, not the way that we interpret it. His sexuality was ambiguous but he was probably gay; how actively so is still a matter of controversy. Or is that just the way that science attempts to explain how we walk? Wittgenstein then goes … It is then the job of the brain to somehow organize this perceptual data, (there is still no scientific consensus as to how the brain is said to perform this function) into a recognizable perception. In other words, when we are observing a singular object that is quite familiar and seemingly unmistakable to us, we simply see it, without any need for conjecture or inference. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. So why call it 'interpreting'? In other words, we see the image as a duck and then we see the image as a rabbit (in whichever order it may occur). For to say that we see an object as something holds the implication that it can be perceived in more than one way, but does this mean that we are making different interpretations of one essential object or image, or are we actually seeing different aspects? 1980. pp. Is that really what it means to walk? Wittgenstein, Ludwig. What could Wittgenstein mean by this assertion? Wittgenstein wants to begin by attempting to clarify what can properly be called a case of interpreting. To say that we 'see' something can stand on its own two feet, without the need for verification by any further supporting account. William Day & Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge UP, 2010), a collection of essays on Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing. By Volker A. Munz. 516. Philosophers who have allowed these elements in the philosophical tradition to influence them have thus created a sharp divide between what one sees and what one infers from what one sees, namely that what one sees is raw sensory data, and all else is interpretation. Wittgenstein discussed the case of the duck-rabbit figure, which we can see as a duck, or see as a rabbit, but not both at the same time.) The purpose of this essay is to attempt to elucidate, assess, and defend Wittgenstein's contentions that there are certain damning conceptual confusions in the traditional philosophical account of what it is to 'see' or to have any other sensory experience for that matter. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in … 1980. pp. When we tell someone to 'walk' to the store, is this just short for telling them to undergo the above process? As a result, for Wittgenstein scientism is just as misguidedly metaphysical as traditional, more transparently a prioristic, approaches. Where Socrates says, “Virtue is knowledge,” Dr. Verdi’s Wittgenstein says, “Ethics is aspect-seeing,” an ingrained appreciation of alternate possibilities and the respect that goes with it. In other words, we each exist as a brain in a vat--and in our case our bodies are the vats. When we see the figure one way instead of the other, we are not actively producing an interpretation of it, but rather our seeing it one way or another is an expression of our visual experience. However, Russell does not seem to get himself clear about how he is using the term, and tends to slip seamlessly from one usage to the other, incorporating both senses of the term into one conflicted concept. In the preface, Wittgenstein describes his failure to synthesize his points into a unified work. So the meaning of the statement, "I see a cat," will lie in a purely physical account of the process that is played out by our sensory apparati and our brain, which can be dryly provided as something like the following (yes, why not hash it over one more time? Click here to search books using title name,author name and keywords. And if all consciousness resides in the brain itself, the conscious act of 'interpreting' can also be ascribed to the brain. 2e. 1992. pp. Most interpretations of this figure, however, are going to be made in terms of what it actually looks like, and suffice it to say, there are a great many things in the world which share the appearance of this figure. This is what it is to see something as. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. Many authors have identified a link between later Wittgenstein and enactivism. It is possible to jump from one such pattern to another and for the two to alternate. Therefore, it seems that in the case of such theoretical reductions of 'seeing', the usage of the term 'interpretation' is terribly confused in that it is characterized by two apparently incompatible elements somehow entangled together into one distorted concept. DOI link for Wittgenstein’s seeing as. Then physics allows us to infer that light of certain frequencies is proceeding from the object to our eyes. Certain patterns of movement are physiologically impossible; hence, for example, I cannot see the schematic cube as two interpenetrating prisms. Those who are gifted in such a way have the ability to recognize the pitch of a sound as spontaneously and readily as the rest of us can recognize colors (of those of us who are not colorblind, anyway).